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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: According to the American Embassy in Moscow, the Taiwan Strait crisis has not given rise to popular apprehension which during the Middle East crisis of last summer led to scare buying and hoarding in the Soviet Union. The general consensus among Western diplomats in the USSR is that the Soviet leaders do not want or even expect war to develop from the strait situation. High Soviet Foreign Ministry officials gave the Finnish ambassador the impression there would be no war. Ulbricht reportedly told his central committee colleagues that Moscow expected to bring the strait crisis to the United Nations for adjudication, with the ultimate goal of obtaining UN membership for Peiping.

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East Germany: An East German party plenum in mid-October may adopt measures to modify quietly the hard course launched by the fifth party congress last July. Such a change at a time when other satellites are tightening up would reflect the Ulbricht regime's alarm over the growing discontent in East Germany, exemplified by the large refugee movement to the West.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO  
Lebanon: Tension in Beirut as a result of the recent wave of Christian-Moslem kidnappings will probably remain high for the next few days. The pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party is likely to carry out its threat to call a protest strike on 22 September and will probably be supported by other pro-Chamoun groups. Extensive violence, however, is not likely prior to Shihab's inauguration on 23 September in view of the elaborate precautions taken by the Lebanese Army. [REDACTED]

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NO  
Jordan: King Husayn, confronted with growing factionalism in the government and in the army, is still considering key personnel changes, including replacement of his authoritarian prime minister, Samir Rifai, and Rifai's protégé, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara.

A UN representative will arrive in Jordan about 24 September to establish a "watchdog" mission there. The semi-official Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, however, has denied that Nasir agreed to establishment of elements of such a mission in the UAR. [REDACTED]

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## III. THE WEST

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[REDACTED]  
France - Algeria: Premier De Gaulle, in statements which are now public, let it be known that he regards either independence or integration for Algeria as "unrealistic." He may have underestimated, however, the extent of military and other opposition to any solution for Algeria other than integration, and he is likely to face open opposition from the army, possibly during his 2-3 October visit to Algeria. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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East Germany May Ease Hard-Line Program

25X1 The East German Communist party's central committee will hold a plenum in mid-October to formulate measures to alter quietly the hard line adopted last July at the fifth party congress, [REDACTED] These measures reportedly will include eased restrictions on travel to West Germany and a slowdown in the drive for full socialization.

25X1 [REDACTED] Party First Secretary Ulbricht and a few trusted colleagues are now preparing the agenda for the plenum and that they expect to ease restrictions without fanfare in order to minimize the contradictions with the fifth congress program. Such a relaxation at a time when other satellites are imposing harsher measures would reflect official East German alarm over the growing discontent in East Germany, which has caused serious manpower and talent losses through refugee flights to the West.

Already East Germany has granted sweeping concessions to physicians in what is openly admitted by the party press to be a move to stem the serious loss of doctors. Additional concessions are not likely to appease the populace and may inspire popular demands for even further liberalization. Furthermore an easing in travel restrictions to the West is likely to increase the refugee flow and thus heighten the dilemma of the Ulbricht regime. [REDACTED]

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25X1 [REDACTED]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Tension Increasing in Lebanon

The pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party in Lebanon has called on its supporters to prepare for a general strike on 22 September, the day before General Shihab's inauguration as president, in protest against recent rebel "provocations." The Lebanese Army imposed a round-the-clock curfew in Beirut on 21 September and has instituted other precautions in an effort to forestall further and more serious violence prior to Shihab's inauguration. The Phalange, however, has called on its supporters to ignore the curfew.

Tension in Beirut continues high, reflecting the wave of Moslem-Christian kidnappings in the city on 19 and 20 September. The incidents began when members of the opposition seized the editor of the pro-Chamoun Christian Phalange party newspaper. The Phalangists believe their editor may have been murdered. Both sides retaliated, in turn, by seizing hostages. By noon of 20 September, 96 Moslems had been abducted, including the cousin of rebel leader Saib Salam. Armed Phalangists are said to have resisted a Lebanese Army attempt to surround their headquarters, and Christians in areas adjoining the rebel-held Basta quarter are fearful of further rebel kidnappings. Despite the release of many captives by both sides, the new tensions have increased the prospect of Moslem-Christian conflict.

If the present situation, which Christians term "electric," continues, the success of the planned general arms collection by Shihab would be diminished considerably. Shihab has supplied arms to the recently legalized pro-Chamoun Popular Social party (PPS), possibly to counterbalance armed rebel groups and to ensure PPS support in the face of possible rebel recalcitrance.

25X1 [redacted] about 300 armed men from Syria have arrived to augment rebel Druze leader Jumblatt's forces in the mountains southeast of Beirut. They brought arms, ammunition, and winter clothing for

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25X1 Jumblatt's men. Two Syrian officers are reported to have accompanied the party. Lebanese Army officers are very disturbed by this move and feel it is aimed at the future Shihab government, since the present government will leave office on 23 September. [REDACTED] Syrian reinforcements arrived recently in northern Lebanon, that 90 Syrian commandos returned to Beirut on 11 September, [REDACTED] a "committee for destructive activities and terrorism" composed of UAR officers and Lebanese rebels has been set up in the Basta. [REDACTED]

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25X1 Opposition leader Nasim Majdalani, a Druze, told the American ambassador in Cairo that, while the Egyptian attitude toward Lebanon appeared favorable, Syria continues to be unfriendly. He intimated that Saraj, UAR minister of interior for Syria, was behind this animosity.

25X1 [REDACTED] efforts of the Lebanese Government to sell American wheat sent to alleviate the grain shortage have been blocked by rebel pressure on millers. [REDACTED]

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### Developments in Jordan

King Husayn has indicated the desirability of certain personnel and policy changes within the Jordanian Government in the near future to avert growing friction among the palace, the government, and the army. The King [redacted] is considering replacing his unpopular authoritarian prime minister, Samir Rifai. Another candidate for dismissal is Rifai's protégé, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara, whose loyalty to the King remains in question. If Husayn is to succeed in developing a more popular and stable government, he will have to remove other unpopular ministers, including Interior Minister Madadha, and seek some sort of accommodation with Jordan's Arab neighbors. These reforms, however, would involve risk to Jordan's pro-Western orientation and to the position of the monarchy. The King's decision to implement reforms and changes in key personnel is rendered more critical by the impending departure, possibly by the end of October, of British troops, which have maintained him in power since mid-July.

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The King's disenchantment with Rifai reflects in part the influence of Court Minister Hazza Majali, [redacted] [redacted] who has sought to impress the King that Rifai's unpopularity threatens the monarchy. Rifai in turn has accused Majali of gross corruption when he was an official of the Jordan Development Board, and has made common cause with Sadiq Shara. [redacted]

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While UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld's report to the General Assembly on the results of his Middle East

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mission has not yet been released, the semiofficial Cairo newspaper Al Ahram has denied reports that Nasir agreed to establishment of elements of a UN "watchdog" mission in Damascus to facilitate communication with the UN mission which is to be established in Jordan about 24 September.



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### III. THE WEST

#### De Gaulle Faces Showdown on Algerian Integration

When Premier De Gaulle visits Algeria on 2-3 October, he may face a showdown with French Army leaders on his reluctance to come out clearly for a policy of integrating Algeria with France. He had earlier seemed intent on concealing his personal views on an Algerian solution, pending the expected adoption of his new constitution in the 28 September referendum. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] he considers integration "unrealistic," however, and on 20 September he was reported to have told a small gathering in Rennes that independence for Algeria was a "foolish solution," just as much as integration was.

Both the military and the settlers in Algeria have maintained they will interpret the expected favorable vote in Algeria as a demand for integration. [REDACTED]

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Much of De Gaulle's support in the Socialist and Radical parties stems from the belief that he will publicly "break with the rightists" in formulating an Algerian solution soon after the referendum. Recent moves have increased the government's authority over the armed forces, but De Gaulle may have underestimated the full extent of the military's opposition to any policy except integration. [REDACTED]

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